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Who leaves, who stays? Gendered routes out of the family home
following union dissolution in Italy
Francesca Fiori1
Abstract
OBJECTIVE
This study focuses on couples in Italy who experienced union dissolution between 2005
and 2014 and investigates the existence of gendered routes out of the family home upon
separation.
METHODS
The empirical analyses rely on microdata from the EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions. Using logistic regression, I estimate whether the likelihood that women
move out of the family home upon separation is associated with contextual
characteristics, the gender balance within couples, and the presence of children.
RESULTS
Women are more likely than men to stay in the family home following separation. They
are, however, more likely than men to leave the family home if the male partner owns
or rents the accommodation, if he is older than them, and if the couple had no common
children. Contextual influences also seem to shape the routes out of the family home, as
women separating after 2010 and living in less densely populated areas are more likely
than other women to leave the family home. Interestingly, some of these influences
have different intensity and significance depending on the presence of children.
CONTRIBUTION
This is the first study of residential mobility following separation in Italy. The
consequences of separation are often gendered; knowing whether gender also defines
the housing consequences of separation, and which other dimensions of inequality are
associated with moving out of the family home, is crucial to inform policies aimed at
mitigating the housing disadvantages experienced by individuals who undergo a
separation.
1 University of Edinburgh, UK. Email: Francesca.Fiori@ed.ac.uk.
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1. Introduction
Family formation in Italy has long been characterised by a traditional model of lifelong
(religious) marriages. However, in recent decades new family behaviours, typically
associated with the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe and Van De Kaa
1986), have become more common. In particular, separation and divorce rates have
increased steadily and rapidly, with important implications for the lives of the
individuals and families involved.
When a couple separates, decisions regarding who moves out of the family home
constitute one of the first objects of negotiation between ex-partners, the outcome of
which will have an impact on their future housing and living arrangements.
Unsurprisingly, a large body of literature has thus focused on residential moves and
housing after separation. Most studies have concentrated on moves out of
homeownership (Sullivan 1986; Dieleman, Clark, and Deurloo 1995; Feijten and
Mulder 2005; Helderman 2007; Dewilde 2008; Feijten and Van Ham 2010; Lersch and
Vidal 2014), as this downward move represents the most common housing experience
following separation for at least one of the two ex-partners. However, more recent work
has extended the focus to all separated women and men, looking at moves to different
tenure types (Mikolai and Kulu 2018a), as well as to different dwelling types (Mikolai
and Kulu 2018b). A specific research thread has directed attention to who leaves and
who stays in the joint household upon separation (see, for instance, Mulder and Wagner
2010). This study contributes to this particular line of enquiry by investigating who
moves out of the family home following separation in Italy.
In spite of their relevance, residential mobility and housing arrangements
following union dissolution have never been investigated within the Italian context –
mostly because of the lack of suitable data recording residential histories. This study
aims to fill this research gap by exploiting the informative potential of the EU Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), an ongoing program of data collection on
households in several European countries (Eurostat 2003). Using the Italian data, it
focuses on couples who experienced the dissolution of their marital or cohabiting union
between 2005 and 2014, a time of important legislative changes, persisting gender
inequalities in the labour market, and weak welfare support. In particular, it investigates
the existence of gendered routes out of the family home upon separation, by looking at
whether the male or the female partner moves out of the family home and what
households and contextual characteristics are associated with these outcomes.
Theorisations of moves out of the family home at the time of separation suggest
that any separating person for whom the costs of moving are lower than the costs of
staying or lower than the costs of moving for the other partner will leave (Mulder and
Wagner 2010). I argue that these costs are related to opportunities and constraints
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produced by the wider cultural and institutional context, the gender balance within the
couple, and the presence of children. Therefore, I address the following two research
questions:
1. What are the main factors associated with the probability that the woman will
leave the joint home upon separation? And in particular, what is the role
played by:
a. contextual characteristics;
b. the gender balance within the couple (or the relative resources
argument); and
c. the presence of children?
2. Is there a significant interaction between gender and parenthood? In other
words, do contextual characteristics and the gendered division of resources
within the couple influence the decision of which partner will leave the family
home to different degrees depending on whether or not the separating couple
has children?
2. Understanding mobility and housing of both partners upon union
dissolution
The relationship between changes in personal and household circumstances and
residential mobility has long been acknowledged within academic literature (Rossi
1955); its centrality persists within contemporary theorisations of residential mobility
(Geist and McManus 2008; Findlay et al. 2015; Coulter, Van Ham, and Findlay 2016)
and housing transitions (Beer and Faulkner 2011), which emphasise the increasing
variability of individuals’ life-courses and the consequent diversity and non-linearity of
their mobility and housing trajectories.
The intuitive assumption that changes in partnership status, and in particular union
dissolution, would be associated with a residential move – as at least one of the two
partners would have to leave the joint household – has been supported by a large body
of empirical evidence. However the ‘induced’ move (Clark and Onaka 1983) of one of
the two partners away from the common household upon separation is often only the
first of several follow-up moves. The urgency to leave and financial constraints (Feijten
and Van Ham 2007) often dictate that this move is directed to temporary
accommodation, and a series of ‘adjustment moves’ are then undertaken to achieve
more permanent and suitable housing (Wasoff and Dobash 1990; Feijten and van Ham
2007, 2010). At the same time, the ex-partner who stays in the common household after
separation might soon be confronted with housing costs which become unaffordable on
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a single income and therefore will also be likely to adjust housing consumption (Symon
1990; McCarthy and Simpson 1991; Dewilde 2008). As a consequence, separated
individuals usually display much higher mobility rates than married, cohabiting, or
single individuals, in both the short and longer term (Feijten and Van Ham 2010;
Mikolai and Kulu 2018a, 2018b).
A recent thread of inquiry has focused attention on the specific question of which
partner moves out of the joint household at the time of separation (Mulder and Wagner
2010; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Mulder et al. 2012; Mulder and Wagner 2012; Das,
De Valk, and Merz 2017; Thomas, Mulder, and Cooke 2017), with the intention of
enhancing an understanding of the mechanisms behind this decision, as well as the
consequences. Recognising the scarcity and inconsistency of empirical evidence and the
lack of a theoretical framework, Mulder and Wagner (2010) developed a theory based
on a costs argument: The core rationale is that the ex-partner for whom the costs of
moving are lower than the costs of staying will leave the family home upon separation.
Costs associated with moving out or staying in the joint household can be either
monetary (e.g., mortgage or rent payments or housing maintenance costs) or non-
monetary (e.g., emotional costs of moving/staying or loss of local ties). Sometimes the
costs of moving might be higher than the costs of staying for both partners, as
individuals generally prefer not to move unless it is necessary. In these cases, it is
expected that it is the partner for whom the costs of moving would be lower (compared
to the other partner) who moves out.
The extent of these costs depends on the opportunities and constraints faced by
each partner and, as such, it appears to be shaped by some of the same gendered
dynamics that govern the relationships between men and women within, as well as
outside the household. In this respect, the relative resources argument (Mulder and
Wagner 2010; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Mulder et al. 2012) postulates that the ex-
partner who has more resources is more likely to be able to afford to stay in the
common household. The most obvious resource is income, and the partner who
contributes more to the household income is, therefore, more likely to stay.
Employment status, educational level, and age are generally considered measures of
income potential and, therefore, of the ability to afford to stay in the joint house. The
impact of relative resources, however, is often not symmetrical, as only women who
contribute an exceptionally large share of the household income are more likely to stay
in the family home (Mulder et al. 2012).
The presence of children is a further element which differentiates the opportunities
and costs of moving and staying for male and female partners following separation.
Although most national regulations promote joint custody of children, the most
common de facto living arrangement is that of children living with their mothers after
separation. As the family home tends to be allocated to the custodial parent, women are
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less likely to leave the family home if the couple has children (Gram-Hanssen and
Bech-Danielsen 2008; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Thomas, Mulder, and Cooke 2017).
At the same time, bearing the sole or main responsibility of children might severely
have an impact on the labour market participation of separated mothers, thus
undermining their economic independence and ability to afford housing costs.
A labour market which offers enough opportunities for female labour force
participation is a further precondition for women’s economic independence both before
and after separation and has the potential to affect not only their decision of leaving or
staying in the family home but also their future housing and living conditions. More
generally, comparative research on the consequences of union dissolution suggests that
the specific national configuration of family, market, and state institutions can
significantly moderate the economic (Uunk 2004; Andress et al. 2006; Aassve et al.
2007) as well as housing (Dewilde 2008) consequences of this life event. Thus, besides
individual and household level factors, institutional contexts and gendered structures
also shape the opportunities and costs of moving out or staying that women and men
face upon separation.
3. Union dissolution, housing arrangements, and legal structures in
Italy
The history of union instability in Italy is relatively short as divorce became legally
possible only in 1970. Partly because of their recent legalisation – and also because of
the strong normative influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which values lifelong
(religious) marriages – separations and divorces have not been as common as in other
European countries. Nevertheless, a rapid increase has been observed in more recent
decades (Table 1).
Table 1: Divorce rates (per 100 marriages) in selected European countries,
1975–2015
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Italy 2.9 3.7 5.2 8.7 9.3 13.2 19.0 24.9 42.4
Spain n.a. n.a. 9.2 10.5 16.5 17.4 35.3 62.0 57.9
Germany 28.1 28.4 36.1 30.0 39.4 46.4 51.9 49.0 40.8
United Kingdom 28.0 35.4 40.8 40.9 52.8 50.5 n.a. 47.2 39.6
Netherlands 20.1 28.6 41.2 29.3 41.9 39.3 44.9 44.7 53.2
Sweden 57.6 52.9 51.6 47.8 67.0 53.9 45.1 47.2 47.6
EU28 17.6 21.7 28.0 26.1 34.0 34.9 n.a. 44.3 43.1
Source: Eurostat.
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The ‘centrality of marriage’ (Rosina and Fraboni 2004) also long inhibited the
diffusion of more modern forms of union, although they have become an increasingly
popular choice among younger generations. It is estimated that the number of non-
marital unions more than trebled between 1995 and 2012 – to one million non-marital
unions in total, and 600,000 among  partners who never married – and that the
proportion of children born to unmarried parents grew from 8% to 25% over the same
period (Istat 2015a).
In the event of separation and divorce of a married couple, Italian laws regulate the
custody of children, the maintenance of the spouse and children, and the allocation of
the marital home when there are minor children. Following the dissolution of a marital
union, the economically stronger partner is obliged to pay maintenance to the weaker
one, although it is not possible to enforce this and alimony is often not sufficient to
grant adequate living standards to the receiving partner (Barbagli and Saraceno 1998).
On the other hand, cohabiting unions receive little protection under Italian law unless
children are involved. Irrespective of the marital status of their parents, children have
the right to remain in the family home – which is thus assigned to the custodial parent
regardless of who owns it – until they become economically independent. Until 2005,
the prevailing arrangement was to award sole custody to the mother (Istat 2016a).
Following the introduction of new regulations in 2006, joint custody has gradually
become the norm, with both parents now responsible for the economic maintenance of
common children. The new regulations, however, did not make an impact on the share
of separations with alimony provided by the husband or of those where the conjugal
home was allocated to the woman. In particular, between 2005 and 2015 the proportion
of separations where the woman was assigned the conjugal home remained constant at
around 60% (Istat 2016a). However, recent court sentences are challenging current
interpretations of family law, indicating that divorcees who are economically
independent and able to work should not receive maintenance payments aimed to grant
them the same tenor of life as before.
It has been argued that these recent changes to family law assume that the two
partners have equal opportunities (before and after separation), which is not the case in
reality (De Blasio and Vuri 2013; Sabbadini 2017). First of all, the Italian labour market
has long been characterised by a marked segmentation of its labour force, between
insiders (typically adult men) who enjoy standard employment contracts and a
significant degree of job protection, and outsiders (typically young people, women, and
the elderly) who face barriers to their entry and permanence in the labour market. In
particular, activity and employment rates have been consistently lower for women than
for men, as was also observed during the period under study (Istat 2016b). The limited
availability of part-time work (Del Boca and Sauer 2009) and the strong link between
employment status and entitlement to maternity rights have contributed to low female
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participation rates and unequal opportunities to remain in employment for different
groups of women. Consequently, women’s participation in the labour market is more
constrained by their family roles than men’s. Among 25- to 49-year-olds, for instance,
the level of female employment is highest for single women and lowest for mothers.
The critical features of the labour market are exacerbated by the conservative and
familistic nature of the Italian welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Saraceno 1994;
Ferrera 2000). Based on the family as main provider of wealth, support, and care, it
contributes to reinforce a gendered model of society where men are seen as the main
breadwinners and women bear a disproportionate share of household and family tasks.
Institutional measures for the reconciliation of work and family life are insufficient. In
particular, the scant provisions of public childcare for children below the age of three
years (Brilli, Del Boca, and Pronzato 2014) makes it difficult for Italian women to
combine work and family life, restricting their chances to participate in the labour
market and undermining their economic independence. This might have important
implications for the consequences of separation, as women will have fewer
opportunities of maintaining the same living standards they enjoyed when living in a
couple.
Further, in a family-based welfare system such as the Italian one, where
intergenerational mutual support is key for the provision of many welfare services, the
extended family also plays a significant role in providing access to housing.
Intergenerational transfers, in the form of financial contributions or inherited properties,
are the most common form of help that young adults receive from their parents to
secure homeownership (Allen et al. 2004; Poggio 2012). More generally, families play
a major role in solving housing issues, replacing institutions in the provision of support
to find accommodation. Social rental housing is residual compared to other European
countries, currently representing about 5.5% of the national housing stock (Pittini et al.
2015), and is insufficient to meet demand (Caruso 2017). Additionally, the share of
owner-occupation is high, while private rental prices are high and largely unregulated
(Mulder and Billari 2010).
However, recent family and social changes, particularly over the last few decades,
are posing new demands. Low fertility and an aging population are causing the number
of households to increase and their size to reduce. Simultaneously, increasing rates of
union dissolution are creating new typologies of households, such as single-parent or
stepfamily households. Broader economic forces, such as globalisation and the recent
economic recession, have given rise to new forms of social fragility and poverty,
mainly related to labour market flexibility and the risk of unemployment, with
consequences for housing affordability and the housing needs of those affected.
Housing deprivation is thus no longer an issue confined to the most vulnerable classes
but increasingly affects an extensive share of the population: older adults, single
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parents, and the unemployed (Tosi 2007). In particular, events such as an eviction,
family separation, or unemployment could cause housing hardship and put further
pressure on family solidarity.
A recent study by Stone, Berrington, and Falkingham (2014) examined the effect
that some of these events have on the housing careers of young adults in the United
Kingdom, paying specific attention to the intersection between gender and parenthood
in determining the chances that women and men would boomerang back to their
parental home, particularly following a separation. Existing literature suggests that men
would be more likely than women to return to the parental home upon the dissolution of
their union, as women are often responsible for the children, which increases their
likelihood to stay in the previously shared accommodation. The authors, however,
emphasise the role of social housing as an important safety net for single parents within
the British context and more generally the importance of welfare regimes in
differentially affecting pathways to residential independence for men and women. In
some contexts, access to means-tested social assistance and social housing determines
that lone mothers might be able to maintain an independent household, whereas non-
resident fathers would be more likely to experience financial hardship and return to the
parental home following a union dissolution. This study explores the issue of gendered
routes out of the family home within the context of Italy, where such social housing
provisions are non-existent and the family is the main source of welfare.
4. Data and methods
This study is based on Italian microdata from the EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC), an annual programme launched by EUROSTAT in 2004 to
provide both cross-sectional and longitudinal information on income, poverty, health,
social exclusion, and living conditions in the European Union (Eurostat 2003).
In most countries, including Italy, the reference population consists of all private
households (and their current members), and data collection takes the form of a rotating
panel, where households (and their members) are interviewed for up to four consecutive
years. The sample is made up of four rotational groups. Every year a quarter of the
sample leaves the panel, while a new set of households are interviewed for the first
time. Annual data releases consist of a cross-sectional data set and a longitudinal data
set with two, three, or four observations per household depending on the rotational
group (see Iacovou and Lynn (2013) for a more detailed account of EU-SILC
longitudinal data and cross-country differences).
The empirical analyses presented here make use of the longitudinal data sets,
selecting from each annual release only the rotational group which appears for the last
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time before being refreshed, thus resulting in four observations per household. The
earliest observations refer to the four-year period between 2004 and 2007, whereas the
most recent observations were collected between 2011 and 2014.
All respondents who were living as a couple, either married or cohabiting, in the
first wave of each four-year panel, were selected if both partners responded to the
individual questionnaire. A total of 29,563 couples, of which 6.1% were in cohabiting
unions, were identified in the first wave and then followed up for four years in order to
observe whether they experienced the dissolution of their union. Our data is to some
extent affected by panel attrition. Of all couples enumerated at wave 1, there are over
9,000 instances where neither partner was enumerated at the following waves. For these
couples, we simply do not know whether they experienced a separation or not. Had they
all experienced a separation, the ‘true’ separation rate of our sample would be as high as
30% – which is implausible given the separation rates observed on the total Italian
population. Further, although we do not know whether these couples have split up, we
do know their pre-attrition characteristics: With the only exception of being slightly
more likely to be residents in densely populated areas and in the centre-north, they
share all other demographic and socio-economic characteristics with couples who are
retained in the sample. Thus we do not expect attrition to substantially affect our
estimates. On the other hand, the small number of couples for which we observe the
dissolution of their union is quite a distinct group: They were more likely to be
cohabiting couples, living in rented flats, dual earners, without common children, and
the female partner was often more highly educated and owned (or rented) the
accommodation. In order to ensure the representativeness of our estimates and to reduce
selective attrition bias due to potentially unobserved characteristics, our empirical
analyses use longitudinal household sample weights specifically designed to account for
these issues (Istat 2007).
In line with previous work on separation based on panel data (see, for instance,
Ongaro, Mazzuco, and Meggiolaro 2009, or Brewer and Nandi 2014), we define union
dissolution as either i) a change in legal marital status from being married in wave n–1
to being separated in wave n, or ii) a change from the presence of a partner in wave n–1
to the absence of the same partner in wave n,2 based on the comparison of partners’ IDs
and excluding when absence was due to death of the partner. This way 587 union
dissolutions were initially identified, of which just above a quarter are separations from
cohabiting unions. On average, 2 out of 100 couples identified in the first wave
2 As rightly pointed out by Ongaro, Mazzuco, and Meggiolaro (2009), this choice may have some drawbacks,
as couples who stop living together not for separation but for other reasons (such as commuting marriages or
living apart together) might erroneously be classified as separated couples. However, these couple typologies,
albeit increasingly more common, still represent a minority (Istat 2011). Thus their impact on our sample
should be considered negligible. Nevertheless, to minimize the risk of misclassification, we checked that the
partner did not come back in a subsequent wave.
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experienced the dissolution of their union in the four-year observation window, with
separation rates being higher among cohabiting unions than among marriages (8.7% vs.
1.5%, respectively).
Information on which partner left the family home at the time of separation was
obtained from the variable ‘membership status’ in the Personal Register file, which
reports whether each household member had moved out of the household since the
previous wave (or last interview), and the variable ‘household status’ from the
Household Register file, which reports whether the household had changed address
between waves. This information was further verified by comparing the
presence/absence of each partner across waves. In most cases, the separation coincided
with the move of (at least) one of the two ex-partners. In a few cases the move occurred
one or two waves later (and was included in the count of moves); in another small
number of cases (eight couples) the partner came back one year later (and therefore the
couple was not considered as experiencing a separation). In 19 cases, neither of the ex-
partners moved out of the family home following separation (during the period of
observation), and in a further 60 cases both moved out to another home. Although
potentially two categories of interest, these couples were dropped from the analysis as
their number was too small to draw any meaningful conclusion.
The final analytical sample thus consists of 499 couples (unweighted data), and the
dependent variable ‘Who moves out of the family home upon separation?’ is a binary
variable assuming the value 1 if the woman moves out and 0 if the man moves out.
A logistic regression model was used to estimate the probability that the woman
would move out of the family household following separation. The model has the
following formal expression (Agresti 2013):
π୧ = ୣ୶୮(஑ାஒଡ଼౟ )ଵାୣ୶୮(஑ାஒଡ଼౟ ),        (1)
where π୧ is the probability that the woman moves out for the couple I and X୧ is the
vector of couple-level covariates.
The choice of explanatory variables included in the model derives from the
literature reviewed earlier and reflects the research questions which guide the analysis.
All explanatory variables refer to the wave before separation, i.e., when the two ex-
partners were still living together.
The first set of variables aims to capture the institutional and socio-cultural context
surrounding separating couples. Although the study focuses on a single country, there
are important contextual differences which might shape the set of opportunities and
costs associated with the decision of moving the joint home following separation
differently for men and women. As indicators of the macro-level context, I include the
geographical area of residence (centre-north and south) and the population density of
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their municipality of residence (highly populated, intermediate, or thinly populated).
Large urban areas – particularly in the centre-north – might offer better employment
opportunities for women, as well as a greater availability of formal childcare services,
thus enabling the participation of separated women in the labour market and enhancing
their economic independence and ability to afford the joint household. At the same
time, social capital tends to be larger in rural than urban communities (Hofferth and
Iceland 1998) and in the southern fringes of Italy (Reher 1998) as a reflection of
differences in norms and the availability of institutional support. Thus, the closer and
more supportive social network in smaller places and in the southern regions may prove
particularly helpful for women – who also tend to have closer relationship with family
and kin than men (Rossi and Rossi 1990) – in their search for a place to move to or for
temporary accommodation (Mulder and Wagner 2012). Housing markets and tenure
composition also vary between urban and rural areas, and the north and south parts of
the country (Caruso 2017), contributing to a geography of different opportunities and
costs of relocating after separation. The variable year of separation (2005 to 2009 and
2010 to 2014) is included to reflect the general deterioration of labour market
conditions and the stricter rules to access credit finance following the economic crisis of
2008, as well as the effects of the application of the new family law regulating post-
divorce arrangements. Rising unemployment rates, more selective access to credit, a
reduction in disposable income, and the introduction of the joint custody might have
altered the opportunity costs of moving, possibly with a stronger impact on the weaker
partner. At the household level, I then consider a dummy for the couple’s union type
(marital or cohabiting). Besides reflecting differences in values and attitudes between
married and cohabiting partners, this variable, most importantly, accounts for the
legislative framework which regulates the separation of married couples. In particular,
women are granted greater protection by law if they were married, although the recent
development of the legislative framework might have attenuated this effect.
The second set of variables draws inspiration from earlier work by Mulder and
colleagues (Mulder and Wagner 2010; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Mulder et al.
2012). Replicating their operationalisation, the couple’s relative resources are measured
by the age difference between the partners3 (same age, woman is older than man, man is
two to four years older than woman, and man is five years or more older than woman);
the couple’s educational level (both with up to lower secondary education, both with
upper secondary education, both with post-secondary education, man with higher
education than woman, and woman with higher education than man); and the couple’s
3 Preliminary analyses considered the inclusion of an additional variable accounting for a woman’s age.
Women aged 30 or younger were more likely than men to move out following separation. However, the
association with the outcome variable (both unadjusted and adjusted for the other model covariates) was not
statistically significant, and the variable was thus not included in the final specification of the model.
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employment status (both partners working, only man working, only woman working,
none of the partners working). The data allowed us to include a further measure of the
relative bargaining power of each partner vis-à-vis the other: the person responsible for
the accommodation, i.e., the person owning or renting the accommodation (both
partners, man, woman, and others). We expect this variable to be highly relevant in
influencing housing decisions following separation. Perceived housing costs (a heavy
burden or not a heavy burden), measured at the household level, is then added as a
further control of the gender balance between ex-partners. Where the couple perceived
housing costs as a heavy burden, the economically weaker partner (usually the woman)
might find it less affordable to remain in the family home.
Lastly, a three-category variable summarises whether the couple had children
living in the household before separation and their age: children in the household (no
children, at least one child of school age,4 and children of other ages). Information on
non-resident children was not available in the data.
5. Results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the sample of separated
couples (as measured in the wave before separation), distinguishing whether the man or
woman moves out of the family home following separation.
On average, men in our sample moved out of the family home more frequently
than women (54% vs. 46%). There are, however, some exceptions worth noting. In
particular, women moved out more often than men if there were no children living in
the joint home before separation (56%). Also, a slightly higher percentage of women
than of men leaving the family home after separation is observed among couples where
the man was older (51% if the man is two to four years older, and 52% if he is five
years older or more), or the only partner in employment (52%), and among couples who
did not perceive housing costs as a heavy burden (52%). Most notably, women moved
out much more often than men (67%) if the man was the sole person owning or renting
the accommodation.
4 Children of school age are defined as children aged 6 to 18.
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Table 2: Percentage distributions of the explanatory variables included in the
analysis
Couples by partner leaving the family
home
% of couples in which the
woman leaves the family
homeMan Woman Total
Year of separation
2005–2009 49 41 45 41
2010–2014 51 59 55 49
Geographical area
Centre-north 74 75 74 46
South 26 25 26 45
Population density
Highly populated areas 49 43 46 42
Intermediate and thinly populated areas 51 57 54 48
Union typology
Cohabiting union 24 28 26 49
Marital union 76 72 74 44
Age difference between partners
Same age 29 20 25 36
Woman older than man 12 6 10 29
Man 2–4 years older than woman 31 38 34 51
Man 5 years or more older than woman 28 36 31 52
Couple’s educational level
Both up to lower secondary 29 26 28 44
Both upper secondary 20 21 21 46
Both post-secondary 8 8 8 46
Man higher educational level than woman 18 21 19 49
Woman higher educational level than man 25 24 24 44
Couple’s employment status
Both working 45 45 45 46
Only man working 23 31 27 52
Only woman working 12 5 9 26
Both partners not working 20 19 19 45
Partner responsible for the accommodation
Both 39 30 35 39
Man 25 60 41 67
Woman 31 4 19 11
Other arrangement 5 6 5 47
Housing costs
Not a heavy burden 39 50 44 52
A heavy burden 61 50 56 41
Children in the household
No children in the household 30 47 38 56
At least one child of school age (6–18 years old) 41 24 33 33
Children of other ages 29 29 29 46
  N 277 222 499
Weighted N 288 241 529
% 54 46 100.0
Source: Author’s elaborations on EU-SILC data.
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Table 3 reports the results of a logistic regression model (model a) estimating
whether the woman moves out after separation.
Table 3: Logistic regression models of the probability that the woman moves
out of the family home upon separation. Odds ratios (and their
significance levels) and predicted probabilities
All couples (a)
Predicted
probabilitiesOdds
ratios Sig.
95% conf int
Lower Upper
Year of separation
2005–2009 (ref.) 1 0.42
2010–2014 1.47 + 0.96 2.24 0.49
Geographical area
Centre-north (ref.) 1 0.47
South 0.74 0.46 1.19 0.42
Population density
Highly populated areas (ref.) 1 0.42
Intermediate and thinly populated areas 1.43 + 0.94 2.18 0.49
Union type
Cohabiting union (ref.) 1 0.48
Marital union 0.85 0.50 1.46 0.45
Age difference between partners
Same age (ref.) 1 0.34
Woman 2 years or more older than man 0.80 0.35 1.86 0.30
Man 2–4 years older than woman 3.41 *** 1.96 5.93 0.57
Man 5 years or more older than woman 2.07 ** 1.20 3.56 0.47
Couple’s educational level
Both up to lower secondary (ref.) 1 0.41
Both upper secondary 1.39 0.75 2.59 0.47
Both post-secondary 1.31 0.56 3.06 0.46
Man higher educational level than woman 1.20 0.66 2.21 0.44
Woman higher educational level than man 1.79 + 0.98 3.28 0.51
Couple’s employment status
Both working (ref.) 1 0.45
Only man working 1.16 0.69 1.94 0.48
Only woman working 0.71 0.29 1.75 0.39
Both partners not working 1.07 0.58 1.97 0.46
Partner responsible for the accommodation
Both 1 0.39
Man 3.73 *** 2.34 5.95 0.67
Woman 0.17 *** 0.08 0.36 0.11
Other arrangement 1.15 0.46 2.87 0.42
Housing costs
Not a heavy burden 1 0.49
A heavy burden 0.69 + 0.45 1.04 0.42
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Table 3: (Continued)
All couples (a)
Predicted
probabilitiesOdds
ratios Sig.
95% conf int
Lower Upper
Children in the household
No children in the household (ref.) 1 0.56
At least one child of school age (6–18 years old) 0.32 *** 0.18 0.56 0.35
Children of other ages 0.49 ** 0.29 0.83 0.43
Constant 0.484 0.18 1.03
Pseudo-R2 0.22
  N (weighted N) 499 (529)
Note: + p<0.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Source: Author’s elaborations on EU-SILC data.
The first set of variables included in the model aims to capture contextual
influences on the couple’s housing arrangements following separation. Of the four
variables, however, only two are marginally associated (90% significance level) with
the probability that the woman moves out of the joint home: The likelihood of the
woman moving out is 47% higher if the couple separated after 2010 and 43% higher
among couples living in less densely populated areas.
The model then accounts for the gender balance within the couple as measured by
the differences in age, educational level, and employment status between the two ex-
partners. Our findings are partially in line with previous studies using similar variables
(Mulder and Wagner 2010). Results show that the woman moves out more than twice
as frequently if the man is at least two years older than she is, compared to couples
where partners are of similar age. No strictly significant associations, however, are
observed between the two partners’ combined educational levels or employment
statuses and the likelihood of the woman moving out of the family home. The only
exception are couples where the woman has a higher educational level than her partner,
in which case she is more likely to move out (90% significance level), compared to
couples where both partners had up to lower secondary education.
Which of the two partners owns or rents the accommodation, on the other hand,
strongly influences the decision of who stays and who moves following separation.
Compared to couples where both partners jointly own or rent their home, the woman is
nearly four times more likely to move out if her partner is the sole owner (or renter) of
the accommodation and five times less likely to move out if she is the sole owner (or
renter). Understandably, there is a strong association between being the sole responsible
person for the accommodation and the sole earner of the household. Thus, additional
analyses (not shown) performed without the inclusion of who owns or rents the joint
home reveal a higher propensity of women leaving the family home if their male
partner is the sole earner and conversely a lower propensity if the woman herself is the
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sole earner of the couple. Contrary to my expectations, women are less likely to move
out (but only at the 90% significance level) if the couple perceived housing costs as a
heavy burden before separation.
The last variable relates to the presence of children in the household and their age.
As expected, whether the couple has children living in the joint household before
separation is a strong predictor of who leaves the family home following separation.
Compared to couples with no children, women are least likely to move out if they have
children of school age. A negative, and significant, association is also observed for
couples with children of other ages.
Table 4 presents the results obtained by estimating two separate logistic models,
one (model b) on the subsample of couples with children in the household at the time of
separation and the other (model c) on the subsample of couples without children.
Table 4: Logistic regression models of the probability that the woman moves
out of the family home upon separation, by presence of children in
the household before separation. Odds ratios (and their significance
levels) and predicted probabilities
Couples with children
(b)
Couples without children
(c)
Predicted
probabilities
Couples
with
children
(b)
Couples
without
children
(c)
Odds
ratios Sig.
95% conf int Odds
ratios Sig.
95% conf int
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Year of separation
2005–2009 (ref.) 1 1 0.34 0.54
2010–2014 1.73 * 1.01 2.98 1.34 0.63 2.84 0.43 0.58
Geographical area
Centre-north (ref.) 1 1 0.41 0.58
South 0.70 0.38 1.28 0.63 0.25 1.60 0.35 0.50
Population density
Highly populated areas
(ref.) 1 1 0.36 0.52
Intermediate and thinly
populated areas 1.39 0.80 2.43 1.58 0.75 3.31 0.41 0.60
Union type
Cohabiting union (ref.) 1 1 0.40 0.58
Marital union 0.92 0.40 2.12 0.88 0.39 1.99 0.39 0.56
Age difference between partners
Same age (ref.) 1 1 0.22 0.54
Woman 2 years or more
older than man 0.54 0.14 2.01 1.34 0.34 5.37 0.14 0.59
Man 2–4 years older than
woman 4.80 *** 2.23 10.34 2.22 + 0.89 5.57 0.49 0.67
Man 5 years or more older
than woman 3.95 *** 1.84 8.48 0.69 0.28 1.69 0.46 0.48
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Table 4: (Continued)
Couples with children
(b)
Couples without children
(c)
Predicted
probabilities
Couples
with
children
(b)
Couples
without
children
(c)
Couple’s educational level
Both up to lower secondary
(ref.) 1 1 0.33 0.54
Both upper secondary 1.43 0.61 3.40 1.55 0.57 4.23 0.39 0.62
Both post-secondary 2.04 0.59 7.04 0.69 0.18 2.57 0.45 0.48
Man higher educational
level than woman 1.20 0.53 2.70 1.19 0.44 3.23 0.36 0.57
Woman higher educational
level than man 1.95 + 0.90 4.26 1.35 0.43 4.21 0.45 0.59
Couple’s employment status
Both working (ref.) 1 1 0.35 0.61
Only man working 1.46 0.76 2.81 0.73 0.27 2.02 0.41 0.55
Only woman working 1.82 0.60 5.55 0.12 * 0.02 0.76 0.45 0.26
Both partners not working 1.67 0.66 4.20 0.76 0.31 1.86 0.43 0.56
Partner responsible for the accommodation
Both 1 1 0.36 0.40
Man 3.11 *** 1.68 5.71 9.47 *** 3.92 22.89 0.59 0.82
Woman 0.08 *** 0.02 0.26 0.46 0.16 1.30 0.05 0.25
Other arrangement 0.65 0.18 2.39 5.66 0.97 31.17 0.27 0.74
Housing costs
Not a heavy burden 1 1 0.43 0.62
A heavy burden 0.70 0.40 1.22 0.49 * 0.23 1.05 0.37 0.50
Constant 0.10 * 0.02 0.41 0.67 *** 0.18 2.43
Pseudo-R2 0.24   0.26
  N (weighted N) 295 (327)   204 (201)
Note: + p<0.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Source: Author’s elaborations on EU-SILC data.
Although most of the effects are similar across the two subsamples and in line with
what was observed on the full sample, there are a few differences worth noting.
If there were children living in the household before separation, then the predicted
probability that the woman would leave the home following separation is always lower
than that of her male partner, with only one qualification. When the man owns (or rents)
the accommodation, then the predicted probability that the woman would leave the
household is 59%.
On the other hand, if there were no children in the household before separation, the
woman is most often the partner with the highest probability of moving out of the joint
home following separation. There are a few exceptions, suggesting that women with
relatively higher bargaining power may be more able to negotiate their staying in the
pre-separation accommodation. Predicted probabilities of moving out lower than 50%
are in fact observed when she was solely responsible for the accommodation or the
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accommodation was jointly owned or rented, when both partners have post-secondary
educational qualifications, and when she was the only partner working before
separation.
6. Discussion and conclusions
This study contributes to the literature on residential mobility following separation. In
particular, it adopts a gender perspective to understand the decision of which partner
moves out of the joint home after separation. The focus is on Italy, a country where
levels of union instability have historically been low compared to Western European
countries but have increased sharply in the last decade. This poses new challenges to
the individuals and families involved, particularly within an institutional context which
offers little support to families facing economic and housing hardship and which does
not adequately protect the weaker position of women within the household and society.
Two research questions are addressed with the empirical analyses. Both relate to
the idea of gendered routes out of the family home at the time of separation. Gendered
structures of society and of the institutional context, as well as gender relationships
between the ex-partners before separation, define different opportunities and costs
associated with moving out or staying in the family home. These are likely to impact
the decision of which partner will stay in the family home and which will leave
following separation. The presence of common children is another important aspect in
determining the opportunities and costs of leaving the family home. Most importantly,
when children are present, the relevance of bargaining models between ex-partners and
the relative distribution of power and resources between them might become less
relevant (Thomas, Mulder, and Cooke 2017), as current norms and practices tend to
favour children’s permanence in the family home with their mothers. Thus the second
research question addresses the issue of the intersection between gender and parenthood
more explicitly.
The notion that the outcomes of separation for men and women may be shaped by
the functioning of institutions such as the labour and housing markets, by the legal
framework regulating the rights and duties of family members, by welfare policies, and
by the extent of family support is well established in the literature (Uunk 2004; Andress
et al. 2006; Dewilde 2008). Although the role of such factors is not directly tested here,
findings from the empirical analysis lend some support to the view that contextual
influences of this nature might play a role in the decision of which partner leaves the
family home within the Italian context. For instance, routes out of the family home
respond to changing influences over time. In the years following 2010, the probability
of the woman leaving the family home increased from the earlier period. This might be
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partly related to the unfavourable economic climate post-recession, when the
combination of austerity measures and high levels of unemployment and insecure
employment severely affected the economic well-being of Italian households (Istat
2015b). Affording mortgage payments or housing costs of a larger common house
might thus have become increasingly out of reach for the economically weaker ex-
partners. Changes in the legislative framework might also have exerted some influence.
The diffusion of shared child custody between parents following the new family law of
2006 might be a reason behind the higher propensity of women (and of mothers in
particular) to leave the family home in recent years.
Then, with the intent of assessing the influence of the gender balance within the
household, I borrowed from previous studies and tested the relative resources
hypothesis (Mulder and Wagner 2010; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Mulder et al.
2012), according to which partner with greater resources should find it easier to afford
the costs of maintaining the joint home and would thus be more likely to stay.
Resources mainly derive from individuals’ position in the labour market and from their
educational level (Mulder and Wagner 2010). Therefore, the partner with a higher
educational level and better employment status should be less likely to leave the family
home upon separation. The empirical analyses include a further variable not often
available from other data sources, namely the partner responsible for the
accommodation. This information clearly defines the resources balance between the ex-
partners and is an extremely powerful predictor of which partner will leave the joint
home – particularly so if common children are not involved in the separation. As the
partner who owns or rent the accommodation is also very often the partner better
established in the labour market, the inclusion of this variable in our model conceals the
effect of the two ex-partners’ employment statuses. From descriptive statistics and
additional analyses, however, we know that women are significantly less likely to move
out if they are the only partner in employment. The opposite is also true, i.e., they are
more likely to leave if they are not employed. Thus, a greater attachment to the labour
market seems to enable women to afford the costs associated with staying and
maintaining the family home. On the other hand, no strictly significant relationship is
observed between partners’ educational differences and the probability that one or the
other would move out. These results are in line with a previous study by Mulder and
Wagner (2010) on the Netherlands.
Age differences might also be indicative of different resources between partners,
as older partners might have had more time and opportunity to accumulate wealth
because their career has been established for longer (Mulder and Wagner 2010).
Similarly, they might have owned the house prior to forming the union and the other
partner then moved in (Mulder et al. 2012). In general, men tend to be older than their
female partner. This age difference reflects the traditional gender specialisation of roles
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and thus couples where the man is older – and in particular if the differences are large –
are regarded as expressions of gender inequality, both in society and within the couples
(Presser 1975; Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986; Gustafson and Fransson
2015). Modelling results show a significant association with age differences, as the
dissolution of unions in which men are older than women results in higher probabilities
of the woman leaving the family home upon separation. A similar finding has also been
observed for the Netherlands (Mulder and Wagner 2010; Mulder et al. 2012).
Unsurprisingly, the presence of children in the household is one of the strongest
predictors of who leaves the family home. Further, the analyses stratified by the
presence or absence of children in the household before separation confirm that the
relevance of the relative resources argument is greater for childless couples: Variables
denoting who is responsible for the accommodation, who is the only working partner,
or what the perceived housing costs are have a more pronounced (or statistically
significant effect) on this subsample. When children are involved, decisions at the time
of separation are usually taken ‘in their best interests.’ This also means minimising
disruption to their normal routine and social life, by letting them stay in the family
home. The real decision, thus, may be determining which parent will stay with them.
Since 2006, Italian law encourages joint parental custody. Jurists argue that its formal
application has not been translated in practice (De Blasio and Vuri 2013) and that the
most common living arrangement remains that of children living with their mother.
However, we do observe that mothers are more likely to move out of the family home
in the most recent period compared with the earlier period, which suggests at least a
moderate effect of the changing normative framework. However, they are still more
likely than men to stay in the family home and possibly to be given custody. This has
important implications. For instance, custodial mothers will need to share their income
with dependent family members, while their caring responsibilities might prevent them
from working full-time. Also, they are less likely to re-partner compared to childless
women and mothers with non-resident children (Bumpass, Sweet, and Castro Martín
1990; Beaujouan 2012; Ivanova, Kalmijn, and Uunk 2012), which may result in
loneliness and lack of support later in life. Thus, if the routes out of the family home are
gendered, so might be the longer-term outcomes in terms of future living arrangements
and well-being.
This study has some limitations, mostly imposed by the data and inherently related
to the nature of the topic under study. I already acknowledged panel attrition, and I am
aware that selective non-response might be a serious issue among separated/divorced
people (Mitchell 2010). It is thus impossible to correctly estimate how many couples I
should have observed separating, although the use of longitudinal household weights
should have contained bias in the estimates. Second, the panel component of EU-SILC
only follows households and their members for up to four waves. As a consequence,
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housing and living arrangements can only be observed in the period immediately after
separation. Moves at the time of separation are urgent and financially restricted (Feijten
and Van Ham 2007), and observed housing arrangements might not be indicative of the
long-term consequences for separated people. Re-partnering, the sale of the joint house
or a court decision granting the right to the conjugal property to one partner may
significantly impact the future housing and living arrangements of separated ex-
partners. Lastly, EU-SILC serves the main purpose of providing comparable
information on household income and living conditions. Although it allows the study of
residential mobility from one wave to the other, and it collects a wealth of data on
housing conditions, it is not specifically designed for the study of the life-course and
demographic events. Thus, for instance, it does not provide information on aspects such
as the reasons for separating, which partner initiated the process or who gets custody of
the children, which are all significantly associated with the decision-making around
separation (Mulder and Wagner 2010; Das, de Valk, and Merz 2017).
Despite these limitations, EU-SILC data has a number of strengths, which make it
a unique data source for the study of residential mobility following separation. First, as
the interviews are conducted on a large and representative national sample, it is possible
to study the select group of couples undergoing separation, an event which is still
relatively rare within the Italian context.
Second, as it is a longitudinal household-based survey, I could derive information
on both partners (as well as on other household members). This allowed me to observe
the gender relationship within the couple and to test the relative resources hypothesis.
Further, as separations were identified through the comparison of the presence or
absence of the same partners within the household between two consecutive waves, the
study is not restricted to legal separation of marital unions but it also covers the
dissolution of cohabiting unions. Extending our knowledge to individuals in non-
marital cohabitation is crucial, as these unions are becoming increasingly more popular.
They also tend to be unions between more secularised, highly educated, and younger
individuals (Gabrielli and Hoem 2010) with higher instability rates but greater gender
balance. However, unprotected by the same legislative framework as married
individuals (De Rose and Marquette 2011), the weaker partner may face particularly
harsh consequences upon separation. Future studies could compare marital and
cohabiting unions to assess whether the break-up of the two types of union is associated
with different gendered routes out of the family home.
Most importantly, EU-SILC is the only source that can be used to study
individuals’ residential moves in relation to other demographic events in the context of
Italy. Therefore this study has the merit of providing the first insights into the housing
outcomes of union dissolution for both men and women. In line with findings from
other countries (Mulder and Wagner 2010; Mulder and Malmberg 2011; Thomas,
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Mulder, and Cooke 2017), it shows that women are more likely than men to stay in the
family home following separation, in particular if they have children. The relative
resources argument is supported, insofar as women are less likely to stay in the family
home when the distribution of resources between partners is unbalanced in favour of
men. However, in the presence of children, the relative resources hypothesis loses
relevance, and routes out of the family home seem to respond to some extent to
contextual and institutional influences, as changes in the economic climate and/or in the
normative framework are associated with the likelihood that mothers would move out
of the family home.
The institutional and normative framework clearly has the potential to reinforce or
alter the gendered structure of relationships within the family and society and therefore
to affect the level and type of inequalities between men and women after separation.
The negative consequences of separation may be further exacerbated by the ongoing
economic recession and by recent changes in the legislative framework which seem to
grant less protection to women. Future studies could explore whether – in a context
where women still bear the burden of all care tasks and face great difficulties in
combining them with gainful employment – these changes will not only aggravate
existing inequalities between genders but also discriminate between women themselves
on the basis, for instance, of their age or of whether or not they have children.
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